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The Past, Present, and Future of 
Federalism: A Symposium Introduction 
Derek T. Muller* 
In Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, Alice travels through her 
mirror and finds herself in a land where things are familiar but, well, different.  
At times things were backwards, like when she attempted to read a poem but 
found it to be gibberish, until she held it up to a mirror and could read it.  Or 
when she tried to slice a cake, but each time the cake rejoins itself and she’s 
unable to pass it out.  The Unicorn explains, “You don’t know how to manage 
Looking-glass cakes . . . .  Hand it round first, and cut it afterwards.” 
In a given political moment, we too might end up through the looking 
glass, where longstanding expectations about law and policy can be quickly 
reversed.  Such a moment is at hand when it comes to federalism. 
To choose one vignette: in March 2018, Xavier Becerra, the Attorney 
General of California and a Democrat, insisted that the Tenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution gave California, and not the federal govern-
ment, power over local law enforcement in relation to immigration policies.1  
Jeff Sessions, the Attorney General of the United States and an Alabama na-
tive, retorted that actions of states like California were reminiscent of the nul-
lification and secession crises, matters resolved long ago in the Civil War.2 
There may be a temptation to be swept up in the moment, in the transient 
political episodes that arise in one political administration or another.  Feder-
alism has a long and storied past, and it will assuredly have a long and storied 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.  Special thanks to Meryl 
Chertoff and the Justice and Society Program at The Aspen Institute for sponsoring this important 
conversation.  Special thanks, too, to the Pepperdine Law Review staff, particularly Kat Ellena and 
Ashley Gebicke, for their organization of this symposium.  Thanks to Beau Carter for his assistance 
in helping with this introduction. 
 1.  Xavier Becerra, Message to Trump: California isn’t in the Deportation Business, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/message-to-trump-california-isnt-in-the-
deportation-business/2018/03/14/0a48d250-2701-11e8-bc72-077aa4dab9ef_story.html.  
 2.  Thomas Fuller & Vivian Yee, Jeff Sessions Scolds California in Immigration Speech: ‘We 
Have a Problem’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/sessions-cal-
ifornia-immigration.html. 
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future. 
But one of the great benefits of a symposium like this one is that we can 
think more deeply, in a principled and consistent way, about the issues that 
unite us.  Sometimes the debate is a matter of law—which are the areas of 
exclusive federal control, which of exclusive state control, and which of con-
current jurisdiction?  At other times, of policy—in areas of concurrent juris-
diction, should both work side-by-side, or is one better suited than the other 
to handle these issues? 
There are undoubtedly substantive areas of the law that affect federalism 
more than others.  Discussions like the ones that took place at this symposium, 
however, offer opportunities for cross-pollination, thinking about how feder-
alism principles reach across these different disciplines. 
This discussion was one part of a continuing project of the Aspen Insti-
tute.  The Aspen Institute has long fostered dialogue and discussion on im-
portant legal matters.  The Justice and Society Program has facilitated dia-
logue from a variety of perspectives to help us better understand the law and 
one another as we pursue the rule of law and seek to solve contemporary social 
challenges.3 
To that end, Meryl Justin Chertoff, Executive Director of the Justice and 
Society Program at The Aspen Institute, reached out to the University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley, School of Law and Pepperdine University School of Law 
about hosting a series of discussions about federalism.  The first of those con-
versations took place at Berkeley, and the second took place at Pepperdine as 
a part of this symposium. 
Scholars at both institutions have written extensively about federalism 
principles,4 and the opportunity to gather and discuss those principles as 
 
 3.  See generally THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, Justice & Society Program, ASPEN INST., 
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/justice-and-society-program/ (last visited May 10, 2019).   
 4. See, e.g., David S. Han, Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 WISC. L. REV. 1135, 1142 
(2014) (discussing the interaction between the First Amendment and state common law); Derek T. 
Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237 (2012) (identifying 
federalism underpinnings of the Electoral College found within state-run election systems that unify 
into a single election contest); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1562–70 (2007) (offering a federalism-based understanding of 
federal question jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution); Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as 
Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial Distrust of the Legislative Process, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
2027, 2100–02 (2014) (examining how the federal judiciary ought to scrutinize the actions and justi-
fications of state legislatures); Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain, Municipalization, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1505, 1554–61 (2005) (examining constraints the 
Constitution may place on state and local entities in eminent domain); Sara Mayeux & Karen Tani, 
Federalism Anew, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 128 (2016) (reviewing “federalism in practice” in the events 
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colleagues, along with input from scholars around the country, proved fruitful.  
Specifically, we discussed whether there are neutral principles that legal 
scholars can agree upon, regardless of the political valence of any particular 
topic.  Discussions like these offer great value when they are not tethered to 
immediate pressing political moments—although political moments may help 
bring the discussion to life. 
Professor Molly Brady offered challenging ways to think about federal-
ism and property law under the Fifth Amendment.5  Rather than giving the 
text of the Constitution independent meaning, the Supreme Court has increas-
ingly deferred to state determinations about whether property has been 
“taken.”  That includes a “reasonableness” inquiry of what state laws gener-
ally permit—including looking across jurisdictions.  That threatens to upend 
the appropriate federalism framework of property.6 
Professor Andy Hessick suggested that there are important federalism 
concerns when it comes to the federal courts.7  At the Founding, there were 
concerns that Article III federal courts would usurp state court power and act 
in favor of federal power over state power.  But today, a great deal of adjudi-
cation occurs in non-Article III tribunals—bankruptcy courts, administrative 
agencies, magistrate judges, and the like.  While we often think of federal 
courts through the lens of separation of powers, in some ways our current 
structure is better explained through federalism concerns.  For Article IV ter-
ritorial courts do not infringe upon state interests in the ways that Article III 
courts might—territorial courts, for instance, are adjudicating local territorial 
law, and state courts are not necessarily a good forum for such disputes.  It 
certainly doesn’t upset any state power by lodging jurisdiction in Article IV 
courts.  Professor Hessick then posited a few ways to think about these non-
Article III courts through a federalism perspective. 
Professors John Yoo and Jennifer Chacón offered complementary 
 
of Ferguson, Missouri); Amanda L. Tyler, Assessing the Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon: 
A Word of Caution, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1742–44 (2015) (discussing the history of federal 
court review of state court decisions); John Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1311 (1997) (defending federal judicial review to delineate separation between federal enu-
merated powers and state sovereignty). 
 5. See infra Maureen E. Brady, Property Convergence in Takings Law, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 695 
(2019). 
 6.  See Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin 
Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PENN L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2017). 
 7.  See infra F. Andrew Hessick, Federalism Limits on Non-Article III Adjudication, 46 PEPP. L. 
REV. 725 (2019). 
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perspectives on federal immigration power.  Professor Chacón cautioned 
against false equivalence in how federal courts should review state immigra-
tion practices.8  It may well be the case that states need not cooperate with 
federal authorities in enforcing immigration laws.  But states might not be able 
to add to—or in some instances, interfere with—federal immigration policies.  
Additionally, there may well be neutral principles that apply to immigration 
federalism, but we ought not lose sight of the fact that sometimes the facts are 
not quite so neutral. 
Professor Yoo looked at the structural barriers of federal enforcement of 
immigration laws.9  Often, what are perceived as ineffectual federal policies 
are ineffectual precisely because the federal government is designed to oper-
ate more slowly.  “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition,” James 
Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers, and consensus among the branches of 
government must exist before a federal policy can be enforced.10  In the same 
way, states might act as a check on the federal government, their ambition 
checking federal ambition. 
Election law offers a powerful substantive area to consider federalism.  
Federal elections are mostly run through, and regulated by, the states.  Profes-
sor Gene Mazo reflected on the tensions between our First Amendment juris-
prudence and state-based election system.11  We have seen the federal govern-
ment’s prohibition on foreign spending in elections run up against state desires 
to run elections as they see fit.  We might expect non-citizens to be a part of 
our political community, but we also exclude them from casting votes in elec-
tions.  Looking at non-citizen participation in politics is a foil for a broader 
tension we see of federal prohibitions on certain activities when it comes to 
elections, but operating within a state-controlled election system. 
Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy advocated for greater federal control to 
prevent foreign interference in our elections.12  While state-elections systems 
 
 8. Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL 
OF RTS. J. 577 (2012). 
 9.  See, e.g., C-SPAN, Federal Laws and Local Control, C-SPAN (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?457107-4/federal-laws-local-control.  Professor Yoo writes on a different topic here, 
discussing the legality of the Electoral College, an institution created with federalism in mind.  See 
infra John C. Yoo, A Defense of the Electoral College in the Age of Trump, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 835 
(2019). 
 10.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 11.  See infra Eugene D. Mazo, Our Campaign Finance Nationalism, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 759 (2019). 
 12.  See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Why Federalism Keeps Me Up At Night, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
(March 28, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/why-federalism-keeps-me-night. 
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may be administered at the state or local level, matters like cyber interference 
and international sabotage require more uniform federal guidance.  Congres-
sional requirements, such as requiring voter-verified paper audit trails, con-
sistent with Congress’s power under the Elections Clause, would improve 
elections in the United States. 
Professors Franita Tolson and Michael Morley offered perspectives on 
the power of the federal government to define the scope of the right to vote.  
Professor Morley looked at Congress’s power to define the scope of the elec-
torate.13  He emphasized the limitations the Constitution places on Congress 
and that Congress lacks plenary authority to define the electorate.  Federal 
statutes that Congress has enacted that purport to recognize non-residents of 
a state as having voting rights in that state are on questionable constitutional 
footing. 
Professor Tolson critiqued the Supreme Court’s opinion in Shelby County 
v. Holder,14 arguing that Congress held broad power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, and Elections Clause to renew the Voting 
Rights Act.15  Even if Congress fails to name a constitutional basis for enact-
ing a statute, courts may still uphold such exercises of authority.  And these 
three constitutional provisions in particular offer broad authority for Congress 
to act. 
Professor Kurt Lash offered a narrative surrounding the post-Reconstruc-
tion Constitution.16  “States-rights” federalism, he noted, is often conflated 
with pre-Civil War sentiment of the likes of John C. Calhoun.  Today’s fed-
eralism, however, must be reconciled with the Civil War amendments.  He 
instead offered a more complete narrative about how these amendments, in 
fact, saved federalism.  Congress believed that the Constitution, properly in-
terpreted, constrained Congress’s behavior in many important respects, and 
constitutional amendments would be the only away to enhance Congress’s 
national power.  And those amendments, while expanding federal power, lim-
ited new enumerated powers for Congress, and also placed new limited con-
straints on the states. 
 
 13.  See Michael T. Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the Elections Clause, 
109 N.W. U. L. REV. 847, 847–49 (2015). 
 14.  570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 15. See Franita Tolson, Congressional Authority to Protect Voting Rights After Shelby County and 
Arizona Inter Tribal, 13 ELECTION L.J. 322 (2014). 
 16.  See Kurt Lash, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Protect Unenumerated Rights?, WASH POST 
(May 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/08/kurt-lash-
guest-blogging-does-the-fourteenth-amendment-protect-unenumerated-rights/. 
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Privacy law is another substantive area ripe with federalism implications.  
The federal government and state governments have struggled with how to 
handle privacy law amid advances in technology that implicate privacy con-
cerns, and optimal solutions remain elusive. 
Professor Babette Boliek examined the impact of data collection, consid-
ering the strengths and weaknesses of state and federal laws.17  While state 
contract law focuses on consent, it doesn’t work well in the data collection 
context because there is often no harm and, therefore, no remedy when it 
comes to data breaches.  And while we often worry about data collection, it is 
perhaps data aggregation that should be our greatest concern, particularly 
when it comes to public data—that is, data collected by state and local gov-
ernments.  Professor Boliek suggested that state and local governments often 
collect too much data that they don’t actually need to accomplish their gov-
ernmental objectives, and that data can be too easily shared with the public in 
breach of our privacy expectations.  States ought to look more at their own 
data collection practices to help protect privacy. 
Professor Margaret Hu looked at the case for cooperative federalism—
and the case for uncooperative federalism.18  In cases of cyber conflict or cyber 
warfare, like Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election, we may 
want greater cooperation between the federal government and state govern-
ments.  At times, state governments might simply be more responsive, such 
as with state data-privacy laws.  And we may also see that federal and state 
interests are at odds with one another, such as data requests from the federal 
Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity with which most 
states refused to comply.  Different federalism solutions may be appropriate 
for different situations. 
Professor Craig Konnoth discussed how health-data collection moved 
away from state-specific activity to centralization and privatization.19  Federal 
collection of health data has been historically rare.  But federal law has re-
cently encouraged states to collaborate and share data with one another.  In-
creasingly, however, private entities have been gaining power in the amassing 
of health data, and they fall outside the obligations and expectations placed 
 
 17.  For Professor Boliek’s general discussion regarding data privacy, see Babette Boliek, Priori-
tizing Privacy in the Courts and Beyond, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1101 (2018). 
 18. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 577–79 (2013) 
(using a cooperate federalism analysis to discuss immigration). 
 19. See, e.g., Craig Konnoth, Health Information Equity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1317 (2017) (discuss-
ing recent federal regulation of healthcare data).  
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upon state governments.  Private entities appear to act less in the public inter-
est given their reluctance to share data with one another. 
Professor Paul Secunda examined privacy in the context of labor law.  
Specifically, he posited that employees ought to enjoy a “right to discon-
nect”—that is, a right of privacy and autonomy that an employee should ex-
pect after leaving work for the day and the right to separate from electronic 
communications with their employer at that time.20  Employers’ health care 
costs are rising rapidly, which might be slowed through better management 
practices.  States are perhaps better than federal government to help address 
this problem.  At times, uniform labor standards might be a better way to ap-
proach employment law.  But here, Professor Secunda argues, modified fed-
eralism might be superior—field preemption with some opt-outs and some 
cooperative federalism.  This model would permit states to offer a “right to 
disconnect,” which might be imitated elsewhere if it helped improve the 
health of employees. 
I am grateful for the conversation that took place over this conference and 
for the pieces that are included in this symposium.  My hope is that it will 
spark federalism-related conversations, across substantive areas of the law 
and regardless of contemporary political events, for years to come. 
  
 
 20.  See infra Paul M. Secunda, Hybrid Federalism and the Employee Right to Disconnect, 46 PEPP. 
L. REV. 875 (2019).   
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